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ROLLING CONTRACTS
Robert A. Hillman*
INTRODUCTION

It is a great honor for me to participate in this symposium on the
occasion of Professor Joseph Perillo's retirement. Joe has been a
leader in the field of contracts for almost forty years, and I have
benefited greatly from reading his influential articles and books and
listening to his presentations at conferences. Having written a leading
treatise on contracts, Joe has made it easy for participants in this
symposium to pick a topic related to Joe's work. In short, he has
written insightfully about virtually every aspect of contract law,
including standard-form contracts, a subject I address in this paper.'
Specifically, this essay discusses how contract law should treat the
problem of what some have called rolling contracts-contracts where
purchasers, often consumers (on whom I shall focus here), see the
terms after paying for goods.
Despite lots of notoriety and spilled ink over the general issue of
standard-form contracts, contract law has responded effectively to the
problem by following Karl Llewellyn's conception to enforce
bargained-for terms and conscionable boilerplate provisions, while
barring egregious terms.2 The foundation for this approach is the
widely accepted fact that, for a number of reasons, consumers
typically do not read their standard forms.3 Instead, consumers give
their "blanket assent" to conscionable standard terms.4

. Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Annie Jeong,
Rosanna Orfield, Jennifer Schultz, Robert Schultz, and Brad Wilson for excellent
research assistance. I tried desperately to come up with a clever title for this article. I
thought of "Rollin' Contracts on the River" (referring to the classic rock and roll
song, "Proud Mary"-you know, "rollin', rollin', rollin' on the river"), but as Judge
Easterbrook said (in reference to one possible legal analysis of rolling contracts) in
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997), "where's the sense in
that?" Or how about "Rolling Contracts Gather No Moss?" Nah.
1. See, e.g., John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 5-6, 15,
382-92 (4th ed. 1998). Kevin Clermont thinks it would be impossible to write about
almost every issue of contract law.
2. See infra notes 10-50 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
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The issue of "rolling contracts" involves one method of presenting
standard forms to consumers) In a rolling contract, a consumer
orders and pays for goods before seeing most of the terms, which are
contained on or in the packaging of the goods. Upon receipt, the
buyer enjoys the right to return the goods for a limited period of
time.6 Rolling contracts therefore involve the following contentious
issue: Are terms that arrive after payment and shipment, such as an
arbitration clause, enforceable?
Theorists and judges generally have analyzed this problem by
determining when the contract is formed.7 Most reason that the
contract is formed either when the consumer orders and pays for the
goods and the seller ships them, or when, after delivery, the
prescribed "accept or return" time expires. If the former, the new
terms that arrive after formation of the contract are proposals for
additions to the contract that do not become part of the contract. If
the latter, the new terms become part of the contract because the
consumer has had the opportunity to read the terms before formation
of the contract.8
Although courts and commentators focus on the time of contract
formation, this analysis actually yields little fruit. First, the formation
analysis is supposed to depend on when the parties intended to form
their contract, but few parties think about this technical question, so
the issue has little real-world relevance. Second, even if the time of
contract formation is accessible, it does not tell us very much.
Assuming contract formation occurs at the time of payment and
shipment, the postponed terms could still become part of the contract,
for example, if the consumer agreed, at this time, to delegate the duty
of providing reasonable terms to the seller. The terms could also
become part of the contract if the consumer, after having an
opportunity to read the terms, accepted them as a contract
modification agreement. Assuming contract formation occurs after

5. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We
Learned?, 7 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 167, 191 (2001); John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry
M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J.L. & Com. 1, 5-6 & n.13
(1999); Holly K. Towle, The UCITA Revolution: The New E-Commerce Model for
Software and Database Licensing, No. GO-00D9 Practising L. Inst. (Apr.-May 2000),
at 206.
6. These are essentially the facts of Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
7. "It appears that at least in part, the cases turn on whether the court finds that
the parties formed their contract before or after the vendor communicated its terms
to the purchaser." Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (D. Kan.
2000); see also Sajida A. Mahdi, Comment: Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of
Contract Formation Under the U.C.C. and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses
Included in Standard Form Contracts Shipped with Goods, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 403,
404 (2001).
8. See infra notes 51 -60 and accompanying text.
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the time for return has expired, courts could still bar the terms, for
example, based on the theory that the consumer never expressly
agreed to them.
Notwithstanding the confusion, I will argue that rolling contracts
should not be a difficult issue. Let's go back to Llewellyn's view that
people fail to read their form contracts and that bargained-for terms
and conscionable terms should constitute the contract. This approach
should be employed to resolve the problem of rolling contracts
because people do not read the terms of these contracts either. In
fact, it is rather curious why analysts believe so much should turn on
the question of whether the seller makes the terms available before or
after contract formation when these writers also believe that
consumers do not read their standard forms either way.9 Instead of
focusing on when the terms are available, the question should be
whether the terms are conscionable.
Part I of this article argues that contract law correctly has adopted
Llewellyn's conception of standard-form contracting. Part I explains
more fully the current legal approach to rolling contracts and the
confusion created by focusing on the issue of when contract formation
occurs. Part II also argues that Llewellyn's approach resolves the
problem of rolling contracts. Because people do not read the terms of
rolling contracts, these terms should be treated exactly like any other
standard terms. This approach affirms the benefits of rolling contracts
for both parties and curbs potential excesses resulting from the
consumer's failure to read standard forms.
Because the debate about whether rolling-contract terms should be
enforceable focuses in large measure on consumer perceptions and
practices-Do they read the boilerplate? Do they expect to be legally
bound to it? When do they believe a contract is formed?-I decided,
in a modest way, to investigate consumer understanding. I presented
my first-year contracts class of 102 students with a questionnaire
containing nine questions. My students filled out the questionnaire on
their first day of law school, in short, while they were still more like
consumers than lawyers. The full questionnaire appears in the
appendix. I discuss results, as applicable, in the footnotes.
I. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS

Needless to say, most of our transactions involve standard forms."'
The nature of standard-form contracting should be familiar to anyone

9. For a discussion of whether consumers should be protected in rolling contracts
situations because the goods are in their hands and "inertia" is on the side of sellers,
see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
10. See W. David Slawson. Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529 (1971) [hereinafter Slawson, Democratic
Control] (asserting that likely 99% of all contracts consist of standard forms).
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whose head is not buried in the sand." An agent of the seller presents
a pre-printed form to the consumer that includes a few blanks for the
parties to fill in. The seller is familiar with the form, having spent lots
of time and money using and rewriting it."2 On the other hand, the
consumer is not very interested in the seller's form. Typically the
consumer does not have much time to study the form, nor the
resources to shop for terms, a search that would usually prove fruitless
anyway. 3 In addition, the consumer could not understand most of the
language even if she did read the form. 4 The consumer also believes
correctly that the seller's agent is not going to bargain over the
boilerplate. 5 Moreover, the consumer assumes nothing will go wrong
with the product but, should it be defective, the seller will remedy the
problem. 6 Finally, the consumer expects the law to protect her from
11. Friedrich Kessler first presented a model in Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943);
see also Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960);
Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983);
Slawson, Democratic Control,supra note 10.
12. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 243 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits of CognitionI.
13. Most empirical work shows that competitors supply comparable terms. See
Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect
of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 391, 430-31 (1990). A few scholars
disagree. See id. at 426-27 (citing Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 10203 (3d ed. 1986); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630,
660-61 (1979). Theorists also point out that consumers cannot search for terms if they
do not read or understand them. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 583, 596-98
(1990) [hereinafter Meyerson, Efficient Consumer Form]; Rakoff, supra note 11, at
1231; Hasen, supra at 428. In addition, few writers support the idea that a minority of
well-informed consumers ensure beneficial terms for all consumers. See R. Ted Cruz
and Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority
to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 Hastings L.J. 635, 636 (1996) (arguing that
the informed minority theory depends on faulty assumptions); Michael I. Meyerson,
The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form
Contracts, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 1263, 1270-71 (1993) [hereinafter Meyerson,
Reunificationj ("Despite wishful commentary to the contrary, there is no evidence
that a small cadre of type-A consumers ferrets out the most beneficial subordinate
contract terms, permitting the market to protect the vast majority of consumers."
(citation omitted)).
14. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, 309 (1986)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Text Anxiety]: Meyerson, Reunification, supra note 13, at 1270
& n.33.
15. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 296 (3d ed. 1999) ("Sometimes basic terms
relating to quality, quantity, and price are negotiable. But the boilerplate-the
standard terms printed on the form-is not subject to bargain. It must simply be
adhered to if the transaction is to go forward." (citation omitted)).
16. See Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1221. As a general matter, 98 out of 103 students
(95%) "expect[ed] the seller to stand behind its product if something goes wrong."
Infra Appendix, survey question 5. However, only 39 out of 103 students (38%)
"expect[ed] the seller to stand behind its product even if the terms say the seller will
not be responsible." Infra Appendix, survey question 6.
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egregious terms. 7 In short, the seller presents a form largely
incomprehensible to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and

the consumer has good reason not to read the form."8
Standard-form exchanges obviously do not constitute the paradigm
"bargain" of classical contract law with the parties on equal footing
and each term separately negotiated. Yet standard forms benefit both
sellers and consumers. By using the form for each transaction, sellers
standardize risks and reduce bargaining costs. 9 Moreover, sellers
avoid costly litigation by crafting their form to accommodate various
judicial interpretations.2 " Sellers likely pass along some of these
savings to consumers in the form of lower prices." Moreover, sellers
can best determine the "particular set of terms that 'fits' the practical
problems and needs that arise ... in carrying out the transactions, 22
and therefore, produce the most efficient allocation of risks for both

parties. Consumers also benefit from judicial decisions that weed out
offensive clauses. 23 In fact, because of the efficiencies and benefits of
standard forms, it is not a reach to predict that the economy would
come to a screeching halt without them.
Moreover, market forces may offer consumers some protection
from overreaching sellers. Sellers may have the incentive to offer
reasonable terms to establish good reputations and to increase their
market shares.2 4 Most analysts, however, believe that competitors

17. See Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 370; see also John J. A. Burke, Contract as
Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 285, 295 (2000). Seventyeight out of 103 students (76%) "expect[ed] the law to protect [them] from any
oppressive (highly unfair) terms." Infra Appendix, survey question 7.
18. See Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1179 & n.22 ("Virtually every scholar who has
written about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth [that consumers do not
read their forms], and the few empirical studies that have been done have agreed.").
My survey reinforces the empirical work. Only 24 out of 100 respondents (24%)
indicated that they read the terms of rolling contracts. Infra Appendix, survey
question 3. Nevertheless, 88 out of 103 students (85%) "expect to be legally bound to
the terms." Infra Appendix, survey question 4.
19. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 296 ("Because a judicial interpretation of
one standard form serves as an interpretation of similar forms, standardization
facilitates the accumulation of experience."); Kessler, supra note 11, at 631-32;
Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1222 (standard forms "promote efficiency within a complex
organizational structure").
20. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U.
L.Q. 347, 350 (1996).
21. See Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1230.
22. Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1204. "[Tjhere is a central theme that runs through
the old law and the new: contracts of adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima
facie enforceable as written." Id. at 1176.
23. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75
Ind. L.J. 1125, 1156 (2000).
24. Critics of regulation of standard forms generally posit the existence of a
market for terms. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 426-27 (citing Posner, supra note 13, at
102-03); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 660.
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supply comparable terms." Moreover, consumers obviously cannot
search for terms if they do not read or understand them.26 Analysts
worried about overregulation of standard forms also contend that a
minority of well-informed consumers provide incentives for sellers to
write reasonable terms,27 but little evidence supports this theory
either.2"
Thus, standard forms present some sellers with the opportunity to
take advantage of some consumers. The portrayal in the literature of
sellers scheming to put unconscionable terms in their contracts at
every opportunity goes much too far, but, obviously, under the
scenario sketched above, sellers have a considerable advantage over
consumers.2" Fortunately, contract law has ample ammunition when
sellers become too greedy. Although the evolved judicial strategy has
many labels, the tools employed by courts largely reflect Llewellyn's
idea that courts should presume express consumer assent to any
negotiated terms and, so long as the consumer has had a reasonable
opportunity to read the standard terms, courts should find tacit or
"blanket" assent to conscionable standard terms. Courts should also
be empowered to strike any "unreasonable or indecent" boilerplate)'
Two of the most prominent judicial avenues for accomplishing these
goals are the doctrine of unconscionability and section 211(3) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The unconscionability principle
authorizes courts to expunge contracts or terms in order to prevent
25. See Arthur Alan Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J.
1855, 1931-32 (1985). Consumer perception may be different, however. Ninety-three
out of 102 students (91%) believed that "some competitors offer better terms than
others." Infra Appendix, survey question 8. In light of this, surprisingly, only 41 out
of 101 students (41%) indicated that they shop for the best terms (other than price).
See infra Appendix, survey question 9. Perhaps they are too optimistic that nothing
will go wrong and that terms other than price are therefore unimportant. See Robert
A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the ElectronicAge,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429,452-54 (2002).
26. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 428; Meyerson, Efficient Consumer Form, supra
note 13, at 596-98; Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1231.
27. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 427-30; Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1226 n.190.
28. See Meyerson, Reunification, supra note 13, at 1270-71 ("Despite wishful
commentary to the contrary, there is no evidence that a small cadre of type-A
consumers ferrets out the most beneficial subordinate contract terms, permitting the
market to protect the vast majority of consumers." (internal citation omitted)); cf
Cruz & Hinck, supra note 13, at 636 (arguing that the informed minority theory
depends on mistaken assumptions).
29. See Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 12, at 242-43 (characterizing
form contracts as deliberately designed to prevent consumers from knowing their
rights); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 44 (1984) [hereinafter
Slawson, New Meaning] (writing that, in his own experience as a lawyer, his firm tried
to draft form contracts "as one-sidedly in the interests of the corporate client as
possible").
30. Llewellyn, supra note II, at 370; see also K.N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52
Harv. L. Rev. 700, 704 (1939) (maintaining that the presumption of assent does not
apply to "utterly unreasonable clauses").
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"oppression and unfair surprise."'"
Courts generally find
unconscionability either when the bargaining process is deficient or
the substantive terms are oppressive, although the strongest and most
persuasive cases involve both.32 For example, when a form contains
impenetrable language or hidden terms that defeat the consumer's
reasons for contracting, and the seller cannot justify the terms based
on its needs, courts apply unconscionability.33 On the other hand,
courts rarely upend terms simply because they heavily favor one
party.
In other words, the unconscionability principle follows
Llewellyn's model of consumer assent to conscionable, albeit very
favorable to sellers, boilerplate terms.
Section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also
reflects Llewellyn's formulation: "Where the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting... assent would not do so if he
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part
of the agreement."3 4 Under this section, the form's drafter must have
reason to understand that the other party would have balked if she
had known of the inclusion of the contested term.35 According to a
comment, terms that frustrate the purpose of the deal, that are
"bizarre or oppressive," and that conflict with bargained-for terms
qualify for exclusion under the section. 36 These are precisely the
terms that are, according to Llewellyn, "unreasonable or indecent"
and therefore not entitled to the presumption of enforceability under
his "blanket assent" approach.3 7
31. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1962). See generally Robert A. Hillman, The Richness
of Contract Law 129-43 (1997). The U.C.C. codifies unconscionability for the sale of
goods in section 2-302, but the common law version applies to other contracts.
Section 2-302 provides in part:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302.
32. See Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A
New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 30 (1981). For a
recent case requiring both procedural and substantive unconscionability, see Bischoff
v. DirectTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097,1107 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
33. See Hillman, supra note 32, at 32.
34. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 (1979), discussed in Rakoff,
supra note 11, at 1191. Thus far, courts have applied the section mostly to insurance
contracts. See Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline:A Guide to Fair
Processfor the University Student, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 289, 330 (1999
35. See Berger & Berger, supra note 34, at 329; Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1191.
36. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. f (1979), discussed in
Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1191.
37. Some courts have muddled application of section 211(3) by focusing on the
signer's expectation. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75
Wash. U. L.Q. 315, 319 (1997).
State consumer protection law obviously also plays a role in policing standard
forms. Most such laws require disclosure of information and bar deceptive practices.
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Some analysts have advocated even more drastic regulation of
standard forms.
For example, Professor Rakoff would turn
Llewellyn's presumption of the enforceability of standard terms on its
head by declaring such terms "presumptively (although not
absolutely) unenforceable."3
Essentially, Rakoff emphasizes the
choice between enforcing terms created by one of the parties to the
transaction and enforcing terms promulgated by the state: "[T]here is
no reason to think that [standard] terms must be considered
enforceable, or even prima facie valid, when they turn up in contracts
of adhesion. The judicial solution may be better or worse than the
drafter's formula, but it clearly is an alternative."39
Rakoff finds fault with Llewellyn's notion of "blanket" assent.
Rakoff aptly criticizes Llewellyn's analogy to a party "handing over a
blank check."40 The "blank check" characterization implies that
consumers assent to whatever the seller drafts, whether reasonable or
not. But Llewellyn's conception of "blanket assent" is better read to
mean only that, despite failing to read form contracts, users
comprehend the existence of standard terms and agree to bind
themselves to them, provided the terms are not unreasonable. Such
assent is not unlike that of a consumer who accepts the various
components of an automobile she is purchasing, so long as they are fit
for their ordinary purpose, even though she has no knowledge
whatsoever of these components.4' In both instances, the consumer
Some also create substantive rights, such as "lemon laws." See Michael M. Greenfield,
Consumer Law: A Guide for Those Who Represent Sellers, Lenders, and Consumers
§ 4.1, at 160-61, § 5.1, at 228, § 9.3.2, at 559-60 (1995).
38. Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1176. Rakoff apparently would enforce standard
terms only when the seller could establish that they are "important to the
preservation of the ability of firms to initiate new enterprises and practices, and that
such enforcement thereby contributes concretely to the functioning of business as a
social force independent of governmental control." Id. at 1242.
39. Id. at 1183. And further,
[T]here is a logical gap between the proposition that mass distribution
requires standardized terms, and the assertion that it requires even partial
enforcement of adhesive terms.... The requisite standardization can rest on
terms stipulated by the common law, or by statute or regulation drafted for
the purpose; nothing inherent in the concept of mass distribution requires
that the drafting party's terms must prevail.
Id. at 1208.
40. Id. at 1200.
41. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 295, 308 n.63 (1998).
[N]umerous studies [indicate] that consumers drastically limit their search
for information about durable [products] like furniture and cars, and services
such as those of general practitioners .... [M]ost consumers for domestic
appliances visit a single store, fail to consult advertising, use restricted price
information, consider only one make, and employ perceptions of the
manufacturer's reputation and packaging rather than make evaluations of
the product/service attributes to arrive at judgments of quality.
Id. (quoting Gordon R. Foxall & Ronald E. Goldsmith, Consumer Psychology for
Marketing 31 (1994)). But see Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, supra note 14, at 309 ("The
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impliedly has delegated to the seller the obligation of making
reasonable selections.42 Granted, given her druthers, the consumer

might not have picked some of the particular parts or terms selected
for her (others may have been superior). The "blanket assent" model
accounts for the joint realities of market constraints and the host of
factors that rationally lead consumers not to read their standard
forms 43
.

Rakoff also questions Llewellyn's assumption that sellers, better
than judges, can determine the most efficient terms for the
transaction.'
Sellers' experience and expertise do not persuade
Rakoff: "The assumption of expertise may be wrong; a businessman
who draws up a form may lack the information needed to identify the
appropriate arrangement. ' 4 In addition, sellers' personal interests,
including defeating competition, may exert too much influence.46
Finally, sellers' drafters (usually lawyers) may overuse protective
provisions in ignorance of the sellers' actual needs.4 7

None of Rakoff's assertions seem overly persuasive. At least as
between business people and judges, the former should be more
capable of assessing the appropriate content of form contracts because
business people inevitably gain understanding and experience through
their day-to-day business activities. In addition, business people want

to draft provisions that will minimize the costs of contracting in order
to ensure the success of their company and, concomitantly, their
careers. 48 Moreover, lawyers, who are more and more frequently
working in-house, play a more constructive role than Rakoff may be

willing to admit. 49 Finally, Rakoff downplays judges' limitations, such
as lack of information, experience, and time.50
same consumer who is willing to read simple narrative text that discloses a product
attribute (such as a list of ingredients) is often unwilling to read the dense text that
comprises a form contract.").
42. See Leff, supra note 11; Radin, supra note 23, at 1149 (relying on Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1976)); see
also Hanoch Sheinman, ContractualLiability and Voluntary Undertakings,20 Oxford
J. Legal Stud. 205, 209 (2000) ("[T]he phenomenon of standard contracts is sometimes
interpreted as a counterexample to [the view that there is an important connection
between contractual liability and voluntary obligation.] But ... standard contracts are
genuine contracts, provided that they are entered into freely and partly in order to
incur an obligation.").
43. On the issue of economic constraint, see John Dalzell, Duress by Economic
PressureI, 20 N.C. L. Rev. 237, 237-38 (1942); see also M. Trebilcock, The Limits of
Freedom of Contract 242-43 (1993).
44. See Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1204; supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
45. Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1204.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1205
48. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 11, at 631-32.
49. See Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 12, at 242-43; Slawson, New
Meaning, supra note 29, at 44. But see Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1204.
50. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703, 1714-15 (1989) ("'[G]overnment,' in the
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Assuming the appropriateness of Liewellyn's approach to form
contracts, how can it inform the problem of rolling contracts? That is
the subject of the rest of this paper.
II. ROLLING CONTRACTS
Although the appropriate legal resolution of rolling contracts is
very controversial," the facts of rolling contracts cases are not
complex. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,52 decided by former law
professor, Frank Easterbrook, is typical. 3 The Hills ordered a
computer from Gateway over the telephone and gave their credit card
information as payment, and Gateway delivered the computer. When
the computer arrived, the box contained a set of terms that would
govern unless the Hills returned the computer in thirty days. 4 The
Hills used the computer for more than thirty days, became dissatisfied
with its performance, and brought an action in federal court. One of
the terms delivered to the Hills called for arbitration of disputes. Was
the arbitration provision enforceable?
Easterbrook reasoned that Gateway's shipment of the computer
and the terms to the Hills with the right to return the computer in
thirty days constituted an offer, and the Hills' keeping the computer
for more than thirty days constituted an acceptance. The contract,

person of judges, legislators, or regulators, is only infrequently likely to do better than
A and B on either the incentive or the information dimension.").
51. See Klocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337-38 (D. Kan. 2000).
Authority from other courts [on the issue of rolling contracts] is split.
Compare Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91 (printed terms on computer software
package not part of agreement); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link,
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (license agreement shipped with
computer software not part of agreement); and U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1998) (single use restriction on product
package not binding agreement); with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997) (arbitration provision
shipped with computer binding on buyer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrinkwrap license binding on buyer); and M.A.
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998
P.2d 305 (2000) (following Hill and ProCD on license agreement supplied
with software).
Id.; see also Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, §§ 103(a), 111, 112(a),
112(e)3, 208, 209(a), 209(b) (2000) (explaining that in a "computer information
transaction," a party is bound to conscionable terms that arrive after the party
"becomes obligated" only if the party "manifests assent" after an "opportunity to
review." The party must have the right to return the goods.)
52. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
53. See, e.g., The Gateway Thread-AALS Contracts Listserve, 16 Touro L. Rev.
1147 (2000) [hereinafter Gateway Thread] (a very interesting and helpful discussion of
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. reprinted from an e-mail discussion of professors). For a
recent case following Hill, see Bischoff v. DirectTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, i107
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
54. Hill 105 F.3d at 1148,1150.
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formed at the end of the thirty day period, therefore included the
arbitration provision and Gateway's other terms.5
Among their arguments, the Hills apparently asserted that the
contract was formed when they paid for the computer and Gateway
shipped it and that section 2-207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code
applied to exclude all of the "additional" terms that followed contract
formation, including the arbitration provision.56 Relying on his earlier
opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,7 however, Easterbrook found
that sellers such as Gateway could (and here did) condition contract
formation on their customers' perusal of the goods and the terms.
Second, Easterbrook concluded that section 2-207 did not even apply
to the Hill-Gateway dispute because their transaction involved only
Gateway's form, whereas section 2-207 applies to "battle of the
forms" situations.
Easterbrook was plainly wrong about section 2-207's applicability.
Nothing in the text of the section limits it to transactions involving
more than one form." Easterbrook also may have erred about the
time of formation of the contract. Section 2-206(1)(b) of the U.C.C.,
which Easterbrook ignored, also applies to the Hill-Gateway facts:
"Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or the
circumstances... an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or
current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a

55. Id. at 1150; see also M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369
(Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div.
1998); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). Only 15 out
of 98 students (15%) believed that a contract in the rolling contract setting was
formed 30 days after the consumer received the computer. See infra Appendix, survey
question 2. On the other hand, a total of 56 out of 98 students (57%) believed that a
contract was formed when the consumer received the shipped computer or later. Id.
Overall, question 2 reveals that the students had no firm perception about when a
contract was formed, which supports the thesis that not much should depend on this.
56. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) provides in part: "The additional terms are to be construed
as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless ....
" The opinion is not entirely clear concerning the Hills'
argument based on the provision. Easterbrook discusses the section in the context of
their distinction of ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), where, the
Hills pointed out, the parties were merchants, the "unless" clause was not satisfied,
and so the contested terms became part of the contract. The Hills therefore must
have been claiming that, in their case, only the first sentence of Section 2-207(2)
applied, and Gateway's terms remained only proposals. For a discussion of the survey
results on students' perception of when a contract is formed in the rolling contract
setting, see supra note 55.
57. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
58. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (D. Kan. 2000);
Shubha Ghosh, Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible
Hand of Norm Creation, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1125, 1134 (2000). "There is one real
howler in the opinions-they say that 2-207 applies only when there are two forms...
. This is just dead wrong." Gateway Thread,supra note 53, at 1154 (statement of Mark
Gergen).
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prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of
conforming or non-conforming goods. ... ",9
Under the section, Easterbrook is correct only if the language or
circumstances show unambiguously that the contract was formed after
Gateway shipped the computer and the Hills kept it for thirty days.
Although the parties could have structured their deal in this way, it is
unlikely that they gave much thought to whether the contract
technically was formed at the time of payment, on delivery of the
goods, or thirty days after delivery.'
Instead, the parties were
concerned with the mechanics of the transaction; meaning, how the
Hills could order the computer, how Gateway would deliver it, when
and how the Hills would receive the terms, and when it would be too
late for the Hills to return the computer.
If the parties did not denominate a clear time of formation, section
2-206(b) appears to control so that the offer and acceptance (order
and shipment) took place before the Hills received the terms. But so
what? The time of formation of the contract does not clearly reveal
whether the rolling terms become part of the contract. 61 Even if the
Hill-Gateway contract were formed at the time of shipment, the Hills'
use of the computer for more than thirty days could constitute an
agreement to modify the contract to include Gateway's terms.62
Under Section 2-209(1), an agreement does not require consideration
to be enforceable and Gateway could certainly have made out a case
that the Hills impliedly agreed to its "new" terms when they kept the
computer. Alternatively, Gateway could argue that, upon payment,
the Hills, who knew terms were coming, impliedly agreed to delegate
to Gateway the right to establish the terms. Or the terms could
become part of the contract on the theory that an implied condition in
the contract was that the Hills agree to the terms that would follow.
Conversely, although somewhat of a reach, even if the contract
ripened thirty days after Gateway's delivery, as Easterbrook found, a
court could still bar Gateway's terms on the theory that the Hills

59. Ghosh, supra note 58, at 1132-33 points out Section 2-206(1)(b)'s applicability.
60. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see supra note 55.
61. Cf. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir.
1991) ("The [parties'] performance demonstrates the existence of a contract. The
dispute is, therefore, not over the existence of a contract, but the nature of its
terms."). For that matter, attempts to label the transaction (e.g., option contract, sale
on approval, etc.) should not help very much either, if the goal is to resolve the
normative question of whether Gateway's terms should be enforceable.
For
discussions of the appropriate label for the transaction, see Gateway Thread, supra
note 53, at 1194 (statement of Thomas Joo) (option contract); id. at 1179 (statement
of Mark S. Scarberry) (Gateway-Hill transaction was a "sale on approval" under
sections 2-326 and 2-327, so that consumer buyers need only notify their sellers of
their decision to return the goods and place them in the hands of a carrier).
62. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (2002).
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never expressly agreed to them.63 There are still other possible
permutations.M6
If the time of formation should not dictate the contract terms, what
should? As with any standard-form contract context, courts should
follow Llewellyn's model of enforcing bargained-for terms and
conscionable boilerplate, and excising egregious terms.6 5 Put another
way, courts should presume "blanket assent" to the terms consumers,
such as the Hills, choose not to read, provided that the terms are not
unfair in presentation or substance.6 6
With respect to the arbitration clause in the Hill-Gateway dispute,
this approach would require courts to focus on whether the term was
procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Concerning procedural
unconscionability, Gateway's method of sending the terms with the
delivery of goods is not uncommon, 67 cost efficient, 68 and similar to
many other types of terms-after-payment exchanges, including
insurance transactions and travel tickets. 69 Easterbrook correctly
points out the senselessness and wastefulness of requiring Gateway's
agents to read the terms over the phone because of the great
unlikelihood that the Hills or anyone else would understand the terms
or even listen.7" Further, other seller alternatives, such as shipping
only after receipt of a signed contract, are also cumbersome and
wasteful of time, especially in light of the failure of consumers to read
their form contracts."1
Put simply, consumers clearly desire the
convenience of ordering goods over the telephone, or this method of
marketing would not exist. Finally, it should not be forgotten that
Gateway affords consumers thirty days to read the terms and return
the computer if they are not satisfied. This procedure allows

63. The definition of "agreement" in section 1-203 of the U.C.C. is the parties'
"bargain in fact," which is a deeply contextual inquiry. See U.C.C. § 1-203.
64. See generally Klocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337-38 (D. Kan.
2000).
65. See supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
66. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 461-63.
67. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
68. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software
for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly
extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers
alike. See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.26 (1990);
Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 211 comment a (1981) ( "Standardization of
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods
and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and
distribution ... .
Id.
69. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Gateway Thread, supra note 53, at 1165 (statement of Kenneth C.
Kettering). Perhaps in the near future everyone will have easy internet access and
sellers such as Gateway can simply post their terms.
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consumers to study their forms in the quiet of their own homes, free
from time constraints and agent pressure common in significant store
purchases.72 In fact, I am unaware of anyone persuasively arguing that
Gateway's method of doing business is procedurally unconscionable
and therefore should be barred.
As a general matter, arbitration provisions are not substantively
unconscionable either, at least so long as the legal establishment
continues to favor them as a dispute settlement device. As one
commentator has stated, "[i]t's hard to argue that an arbitration clause
itself is unconscionable, 7 3given that Congress has declared that the
national policy favors it."
Despite arbitration's current high standing, courts should be ready
to step in when the particular facts suggest an arbitration clause's
bankruptcy, unfairness, and hence its substantive unconscionability.
In fact, courts have done just that in the rolling contract setting. For
example, in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 4 the court followed Hill v.
Gateway's analysis of contract formation and held that Gateway's
terms became part of the contract. However, the court also found
that Gateway's arbitration term was substantively unconscionable
because it unreasonably favored Gateway. 75 Although the court
approved of the arbitration provision's requirement of arbitration in
Chicago before the ICC, the provision also required Brower to pay
"excessive costs" that "surely [serve] to deter the individual consumer
from invoking the process. ' 76 Further, "[b]arred from resorting to the
courts by the arbitration clause in the first instance, the designation of
a financially prohibitive forum effectively bars consumers from this
forum as well; consumers are thus left with no forum at all in which to
'77
resolve a dispute.
CONCLUSION

In sum, rolling contracts, as described above, should be treated no
differently than other form contracts. Existing law's presumption of
"blanket assent" and policing of seller misconduct allows for an
efficient and fair presentation of terms in both traditional and rolling
contract settings.
The only difference between rolling contracts and paradigm
standard-form transactions is whether consumers have the
opportunity to read the terms before or after payment and delivery of
72. See generally Hillman and Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 447-50 (discussing
social pressures on consumers not to read and discuss terms).
73. Gateway Thread, supra note 53, at 1172 (statement of Franklin G. Snyder); see
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
74. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (App. Div. 1998).
75. Id. at 574.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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A good argument can be made that, if anything, the

opportunity to read the terms at home creates more of a reason to
enforce standard terms in the rolling contract context."8

But, if

consumers generally do not read standard terms under any
circumstances, the particular time at which they could have read them
should not control their legal treatment.7 9 Consumers will purchase
Gateway computers and ignore the terms regardless of whether they
have the opportunity to see the terms before or after the computer is

delivered.
Undoubtedly, Gateway and other similarly situated sellers bank on
few consumers taking the time or trouble and bearing the expense of

returning the goods, even if they do read the form and uncover

provisions they do not like.8" Although annoying, return costs rarely

should be significant. Accordingly, if consumers who read forms fail
to return the goods it must mean that they do not value the cost of the
terms very highly." As Professor White has put it, "[t]he cost of

[unexpected]... terms to the offeree [the consumer] cannot exceed
the cost the offeree would incur to reject the offer, or else the offeree

would reject."82 It also bears repeating that even if a consumer reads

her form and keeps the goods, she will not have to abide by egregious
terms.
Critics of rolling contracts may have two additional concerns with
the analysis in this article. First, perhaps they are uneasy about the
adequacy of current law's policing of unconscionable terms. If that is
their worry, they should expend their energy by urging lawmakers to

beef up the protection of unconscionability and Restatement (Second)
section 211(3), not by participating in a dead-end debate over when
the contract was formed. Second, perhaps critics believe consumers
should be able to bring class actions to aggregate their minor
grievances that would not otherwise be heard because of the costs of
78. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 480.
79. Professor Kenneth Kettering makes the point as follows: "The focus on the
process by which the terms are communicated to the buyer before the buyer makes
the final decision whether to consummate the purchase seems to me ultimately a red
herring.... [un most cases buyers will not bother to read or fathom the significance
of the terms." Gateway Thread, supra note 53, at 1165 (statement of Kenneth C.
Kettering) (quotations omitted).
80. See Matthew J. Smith, Comment, An Overview of the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act. Warranties, Self-Help, and Contract Formation-Why
UCITA Should be Renamed "The Licensors' ProtectionAct", 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. 389, 399
(2001).
81. Of course, these consumers may be too optimistic that nothing will go wrong.
See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 452-54. But that is one of the reasons
why courts have the power to strike egregious terms.
82. James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1693, 1717 (2000).
White also points out that the savings to business caused by courts honoring rolling
contract terms greatly outweighs the cumulative cost of returning goods, mainly
because costs of return are low and few consumers will want to avail themselves of the
right. Id. at 1719-20.
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bringing individual claims. Enforceable agreements to arbitrate shortcircuit such class actions.s3 If that is their concern, critics should fight
to convince lawmakers to reverse the national policy favoring
arbitration, at least in the consumer context, and to make arbitration
clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts. 4 If successful, and if the
costs to consumers of arbitration actually do outweigh the benefits,
this strategy would serve not just consumers involved in rolling
contracts, but all consumers who are parties to standard forms.
APPENDIX

Contracts-Professor Hillman
(Questions 1 and 2 are based on the following scenario:)
You see an ad in the paper for a particular computer at a particular
price from a reputable company, Gateway 2000, Inc. The ad mentions
that the computer comes with a set of contract terms enclosed in the
package. You call the phone number provided and order a computer.
You give Gateway's agent your credit card number. Gateway ships
the computer to you. You receive the packaged computer and open
the package. You find a set of terms inside the package dealing with,
among other things, the promised quality of the goods and your rights
if the goods are defective. Another term allows you to return the
computer within 30 days for a full refund. You keep the computer for
more than 30 days.
1. Do you believe you have entered an enforceable contract with
Gateway 2000, Inc.?
Yes 99 No 3
2. If you believe you have an enforceable contract, when was it
formed?
a. When you call Gateway 0
b. When you order the product 11
c. When you give your credit card information 25
d. When Gateway ships the computer 6
e. When you receive the packaged computer 20
f. When you open the package and see the set of terms 14
g. When you have an opportunity to read the terms 3
h. When you begin using the computer 4
i. 30 days after you receive the computer 15
(For the following questions 3 through 7, assume you have
purchased goods with terms included in the package dealing with,

83. Gateway Thread, supra note 53, at 1167 (statement of Jean Braucher).
84. Id.
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among other things, the promised quality of the goods and your rights
if the goods are defective.)
3. As a general matter, when goods are delivered to you, do you
read the terms enclosed in the package before using the goods?
Yes 24 No 76
4. Do you expect to be legally bound to the terms enclosed in the
package?
Yes 88 No 15
5. Do you expect the seller to stand behind its product if something
goes wrong?
Yes 98 No 5
6. Do you expect the seller to stand behind its product even if the
terms say the seller will not be responsible?
Yes 39 No 64
7. Do you expect the law to protect you from any oppressive
(highly unfair) terms by refusing to enforce them?
Yes 78 No 25
8. Do you believe some competitors offer better terms than others?
Yes 93 No 9
9. Do you shop around before making a purchase, seeking the best
contract terms (other than price)?
Yes 41 No 60

Notes & Observations

